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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the impact of the corporate governance, using a plethora of 
measures, on the US investment bank performance over the 2000-2012 period. The 
end of the sample period offers a unique set of information, related to the credit 
crunch, that we model using a dynamic threshold analysis to reveal new insights into 
the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance under stress. 
Results show that the board size asserts a negative effect on performance consistent 
with the ‘agency cost hypothesis’,  in particular for banks with board size higher than 
ten members. Threshold analysis reveals that in the post-crisis period most of  
investment banks opt for boards with less than ten  members, aiming to decrease 
agency conflicts that large boards suffer from. We also find evidence of a negative 
association between operational complexity and performance. Moreover, CEO power 
asserts a positive effect on performance in line with the ‘stewardship hypothesis’. In 
addition, an increase of the ownership held by the board has a negative impact on 
performance, predominantly present in banks below an identified threshold. On the 
other hand,  banks with board ownership above the threshold value this effect turns 
positive, indicating an alignment between shareholders’ and managers’ incentives.  
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The liberalization and the globalization of financial services in combination with rapid 
advances in financial innovation have significantly broadened the variety of operations in 
which investment banks engage over the last two decades. Such operations include the 
issuance of debt or equity securities in the primary market, the financial advisory services, the 
trading of securities in the secondary market and asset back securitisation. As a result, the 
performance of investment banking industry, through complex and far reaching operations, 
has the utmost importance for the well functioning of global financial markets. Yet, few 
studies (Brunnermeier and Pederson, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010; Radic et al., 2012) appear 
to examine the underlying determinants of  investment banks. This paper bridges this gap in 
the literature and further reveals a crucial link between corporate governance and 
performance. 
 
No-where in the world investment banks’ activities have been as influential as in the US 
economy. US investment banks captured more than half (58%) of the global investment 
banking revenues in 2012,  while in the same year US investment banking accounted for 30%  
of the total US banking industry profits. Alas, investment banking has also been held 
accountable for the credit crunch in 2008 that hit the US and then spread  globally. In fact, the 
credit crunch is a manifestation of the possible detrimental impact of investment banking on 
the financial market (Brunnermeier and Pederson, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga; 2010). 
Moreover, the US financial market towards the end of the last decade entered a period of 
unprecedented instability where the estimated losses due to subprime mortgages alone were 
between $400bn and $500bn (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2012). As a result, also, investment 
banks went through some very dramatic changes. Bear Stearns  was acquired by JP Morgan 
with the financial support of the Federal Reserve Bank, Merrill Lynch had to raise a 
substantial volume of capital to cover high realised losses on assets, whereas Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) and Acharya and 
Richardson (2009) argue that part of the causes of the crisis should be traced to the 




investment bank’s activities is so intricate that resembles a black box. The shift of financial 
institutions into high level of complex operations might have contributed to the crisis 
resulting in the underperformance of investment banks and the financial system as a whole 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). 2 The fact is though that the degree of complexity of 
investment banking is closely related to the underlying corporate governance (Adams and 
Mehran, 2012). To this end, an inquest into the operation of investment banks necessitates a 
detail study of their corporate governance.   
 
In this paper, we focus on the impact of the corporate governance on investment bank 
performance. Due to the crisis of 2007, the governance of financial institutions has been into 
the spotlight (Erkens et al., 2012; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; 
Aebi et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013), whilst a growing perception about the detrimental 
role of corporate governance has gained support (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Coming up with a 
definition of corporate governance is not an easy task. Gillan and Starks (1998) define 
corporate governance as an internal mechanism that is closely linked to the system of acts, 
laws, and dynamics that control the operations of a firm. Corporate governance is as complex 
as investment banking operations and one needs to categorise its different mechanisms. 
Broadly speaking, there are five main components of corporate governance: board structure, 
CEO power, compensation, managerial incentives and operational complexity. In terms of 
board structure, the focus is on board size, board composition and gender diversity. The 
majority of the corporate governance literature relates to the board size and the board 
composition (Adams and Mehran, 2008; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Guest, 2008; Pathan, 
2009; Faleye and Krishnan, 2010; Tanna et al., 2011; Pathan and Faff, 2013). Gender 
diversity has not been under the microscope as, to the best of our knowledge, there is just one 
study that examines the relationship between the gender diversity and the performance of 
bank holding companies (Pathan and Faff, 2013).  
 
Moreover, a significant amount of studies focuses on CEO duality as a proxy of the CEO 
power (Boyd, 1995; Baliga et al., 1996; Daily and Johnson, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998; Adams 
et al., 2005; Ballinger and Marcel, 2010).3 Another proxy of the CEO power is the ‘internally’ 
 
2  Fernando et al. (2012) demonstrate that firms that had as their main equity underwriter Lehman 
Brothers suffered economically and their earnings experienced a substantial fall.  
3 CEO duality corresponds to the case where CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors and can 




hired CEO (May, 1995; Adams et al., 2005).4 To the best of our knowledge,  there is no study 
to examine the relationship between the ‘internally’ hired CEO and investment bank 
performance. Regarding the executive compensation, numerous studies (Hillgeist and 
Penalva, 2003; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Core et al., 2003; Frye, 2004; Brick et al., 2006)  
stress the presence  of a significant relationship between CEO compensation and performance. 
Compensation is typically categorised into cash, that includes base salary and bonus, and 
equity compensation, that includes stock options and restricted stock grants and constitutes 
the long-term compensation form. However, the compensation of top executives (top 
management team, TMT) apart from the chief executive officer has received very little 
empirical attention due to the assumption that the compensation schemes of TMT are 
‘isomorphic’ with those of CEO (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002). However, Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1996) and Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) argue that there is no evidence to 
support the convergence between the compensation of CEO and that of TMT, while 
Hambrick (1995) shows that there is large gap among them. Given the ongoing debate, in our 
model we consider the compensation of both the TMT and the CEO. 
 
Managerial incentives is also an important element of corporate governance. The vast 
majority of empirical work that focuses on managerial incentives is centred around the 
ownership held by executives (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Pi and 
Timme, 1993). In addition, the 2007 financial crisis further highlighted the importance of the 
managerial incentives. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) show that CEO incentives have not 
contributed to the 2007 meltdown of the banking industry as a whole. In addition to this, 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) perform a cross-country comparison of financial institutions for the 
2007-2008 period and  find that banks with boards that hold high level of ownership operate 
worse than banks with boards that hold low level of ownership. Hence, the empirical 
evidence seems inconclusive regarding the impact of managerial incentives on performance 
and further investigation is warranted. 
 
Lastly, the operational and organizational complexity of large banks has been proposed as 
one of the main causes of the financial crisis (Felsenthal, 2009).5 As complexity increases 
there is  need for additional independent board members so as to improve performance with 
the expertise they are supposed to bring (Adams and Mehran, 2012). However, an increase of 
 
4 ‘Internally’ hired CEO is  the CEO who is the founder of company or has served before as a member of the 
boardroom. Hence, an ‘internally’ hired CEO’ has a long term involvement with the firm. 




independent board members could raise free-riding problems from low attendance and low 
commitment at board and committee meetings (Jensen, 1993). Looking at the banking 
industry, Adams and Mehran (2012) find that there exists a negative relationship between the 
operational complexity and performance. However, there is no study that investigates the 
relationship between complexity and investment bank performance, in particular after 
controlling for board and committee meetings related variables. 
 
In some detail, this study contributes to the literature in several ways. It is the first study to 
examine the impact of corporate governance on investment bank performance during the pre-
crisis and post-crisis period. Secondly, we employ a plethora of corporate governance 
measures including: board structure, CEO power, compensation, managerial ownership and 
operational complexity. Thirdly, from a methodological point of view, we take into account 
endogeneity issues by using dynamic panel analysis. Lastly, for the first time we opt for a 
dynamic threshold model (Kremer et al., 2011) to investigate possible regime shifts during 
the crisis, in particular in relation to some key corporate governance determinants of 
investment bank performance. The advantage of this analysis is that different regimes could 
be endogenously identified from the underlying data generating process.  
 
The end of the sample period offers a unique set of information, related to the credit crunch, 
that we model using a dynamic threshold analysis to reveal new insights into the relationship 
between corporate governance and bank performance under stress. Results show that the 
board size asserts a negative effect on performance consistent with the ‘agency cost 
hypothesis’,  in particular for banks with board size higher than ten members. Threshold 
analysis reveals that in the post-crisis period most of  investment banks opt for boards with 
less than ten  members, aiming to decrease agency conflicts that large boards suffer from. We 
also find evidence of a negative association between operational complexity and performance. 
Moreover, CEO power asserts a positive effect on performance in line with the ‘stewardship 
hypothesis’. In addition, an increase of the ownership held by the board has a negative impact 
on performance, predominantly present in banks below an identified threshold. On the other 
hand,  banks with board ownership above the threshold value this effect turns positive, 





 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses development 
and discusses the related literature review. Section 3 presents the data and Section 4 the 
methodology. Section 5 provides the empirical findings and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature and hypotheses development  
2.1. Board size and bank performance 
Agency theorists argue that a large board can be less efficient than a small board, as when the 
number of the board members increases agency conflicts rise as well (Jensen 1993; Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992). Yermack (1996)  and Eisenberg et al. (1998) finds that there is a negative 
relationship between  board size and firm performance, as when boards are too big there is 
information asymmetry due to inefficient communication and cooperation costs. On the 
contrary, an earlier study by Pfeffer (1972) finds that board size is positively linked to the 
performance of firms that have large size. The reason being that large firms have a greater 
need of more board members who can legitimate the company to its external environment. 
Turning to the banking sector, the studies by  Adams and Mehran (2008) and Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) find that there is positive relationship between board size and the ratio of 
bank market value-to-book value (Tobin’s Q). There is no clear  empirical evidence with 
respect to the impact of board size on performance,  hence: 
H1: An increase in the number of board members could have a significant (positive or 
negative) effect on the performance of US  investment banks. 
2.2. Board composition and bank performance 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that more independent oriented boards are positively 
related with firm performance. Dalton et al. (1998) suggest that independent directors 
minimize managerial entrenchment risk through their expertise and objectivity in the decision 
making process. Anderson and Reed (2004) find that the performance of  S&P500 firms is 
positively driven by the existence of more independent members in the boardroom. Evidence 
from the banking sector shows that an increase in the number of independent directors has a 
positive impact on return on the invested capital for a sample of European banks (Busta, 
2007). Moreover, Tanna et al. (2011) find positive relationship between board composition 
and bank efficiency for seventeen UK banking institutions. On the contrary, there is 
theoretical background to support that there is no conflict between the interests of 
shareholders and managers (‘stewardship theory’ by Donaldson, 1990). This concept 




positively contribute to firm performance, as insiders have more experience and better firm-
specific knowledge (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997). Also, higher level of independence 
may result in infertile political activity by non-independent members that lessen the 
productivity of the outsiders  and decreases the cooperation among the board members 
(Westphal, 1998, 1999). Coles’ and Hesterly (2000) findings lend support to the ‘stewardship 
theory’ as they show that insiders on the board improve stock performance when the 
chairman is independent. Our theoretical and empirical analysis shows that there is no general 
agreement on the impact of the board independence on performance, therefore:  
H2: An increase in the proportion of independent directors could have a significant (positive 
or negative) impact on the US  investment bank performance. 
2.3. Gender diversity and bank performance 
Robinson and Dechant (1997) suggest that female directors are likely to be more committed 
to their duties and communicate better with the other board directors. In support of the view 
that women are more productive at this level of hierarchy, Eagly and Carli (2003) argue that  
the “glass ceiling” effect motivates females  to be even more proficient in order to reach these 
kind of positions in a firm. The ‘glass ceiling hypothesis’  explains the gender discrimination 
in a firm. Under this hypothesis, there is misperception that women have inferior skills than 
men and therefore they face additional hurdles to enter the market and hold a directorship 
(Martell, 1999; Baxter and Wright, 2000). The earlier study by Shrader  et al. (1997) examine 
the impact of the women presence in the boardroom on the performance of 200 US firms and 
find that there is negative effect. On the contrary,  Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) find a 
positive relationship between their gender diversity determinants and firm performance of 
non-financial firms in Spain.6 In similar lines, Francoeur et al. (2008) suggest that policies to 
increase the proportion of female members in both the management and governance 
structures would improve firm performance. On the contrary, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find 
that there is no significant positive impact from the announcement of a woman directorship 
on stock performance. To the extent of our knowledge, empirical evidence from a banking 
perspective is scarce, as there is only one study by Pathan and Faff (2013) that have explored 
the impact of gender diversity on bank performance. They find that gender diversity, 
estimated as the percentage of total directors who are female, has a positive impact on bank 
 
6 The gender diversity is proxied by two different measures. A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
there exists a woman in the boardroom, and the percentage of the female members in the board composition. 




performance. However, this relationship becomes weaker in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
period (2003-2006) and the period after the financial crisis (2007-2011). There is no general 
consensus on the impact of the female presence on performance as  it depends more on the 
individual nature and needs of its corporation (Harrigan, 1981), thus:   
H3: An increase in the proportion of female board members could have a significant impact 
(positive or negative) on the performance of US investment banks. 
 2.4 CEO power and bank performance 
CEO power could  influence board decisions and reduce the independency of the board of 
directors. According to the ‘entrenchment hypothesis’, entrenchment risk occurs when 
managers obtain so much power and are able to use it to maximize their own utility rather 
than the value of shareholders (Weisbach, 1988; Finkelstein and D’Aveni 1994). Against this 
view, there is theoretical background termed as stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990; Barney 
1990) suggesting that a strong CEO would act as a good agent of company assets and firm 
would take advantage of the unity of direction and strong command and control that the 
powerful CEO would offer. Donaldson and Davis (1991) find positive relationship between 
CEO power, estimated as the CEO duality, and  stock returns for 337 US firms in 1987. On 
the contrary,  a study by Boyd (1995) lends support for the agency theory and finds that CEO 
duality has a negative impact on the return on equity of 192 US companies in 1980. Turning 
to the banking sector, Mishra and Nielsen (2000) find that for a sample of 89 commercial 
banks the CEO duality has a negative impact on their performance estimated by return on 
average assets and return on average equity. Our above discussion shows that there is no 
general agreement with regards to the impact of the CEO power on bank performance, 
therefore: 
H4:  Higher CEO power could have a significant (positive or negative) impact on  the US 
investment bank performance. 
 
2.5. Executive compensation and bank performance 
The executive compensation has attracted the interest of researchers as it could be perilous to 
the corporate governance of firms (Barro and Barro,1990; Zajac and Westphal, 1994; 
Hubbard and Palia, 1995; Crawford et al., 1995; Bedchuk et al., 2009). Compensation is 
typically categorised into two forms: 1) cash that includes base salary and bonus, and 2) 




long-term compensation form. Agency theorists argue that long-term  form of compensation 
better aligns managers’ and shareholders’ incentives (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), as long-
term pay normally reward managers when they meet firms’ performance goals (Baysinger 
and Hoskisson, 1990). In similar lines, empirical research (Harris and Raviv, 1979; Grossman 
and Hart, 1983; Hillgeist et al., 2003; Frye 2004) shows that the tying of compensation, i.e. 
increase of equity-based compensation, to the firm performance motivates CEOs to make 
decisions that maximize corporate value. However, the compensation of top executives (top 
management team, TMT) apart from the chief executive officer has received very little 
empirical attention due to the assumption that the compensation schemes of TMT are 
‘isomorphic’ with those of CEO (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002). However, Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, (1996) and Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) argue that there is no evidence to 
support the convergence between the compensation of CEO and TMT, while Hambrick (1995) 
shows that there is large gap  among them. The above theoretical and empirical analysis 
shows that the association between the CEO equity-based compensation  and performance 
could be positive, thus: 
H5:  An increase in the CEO equity-based compensation could have a positive impact on the 
US investment bank performance, after controlling for TMT compensation. 
 
2.6. Ownership and bank performance 
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Eisenhardt (1989), the distinction of the 
ownership and managerial control leads to the misalignment of shareholders’ and board’s 
interests. Corporate governance analysts generally claim that managers’ interest are in line 
with shareholders’ when the former have partial ownership of the company (Murphy, 1999). 
In support of this perception,  Pi and Timme (1993) find that for non-chairman CEO of banks 
there is a positive relationship between ownership and performance. Lately, the financial 
crisis has motivated researchers to examine the corporate governance of banking entities in 
terms of managers’ incentives over the period of the financial crisis.  However, Fahlenbrach 
and  Stulz (2011) find that there is no statistical evidence that the CEO incentives were not in 
line with the shareholders’ interests in the period of financial crisis. Moreover, Beltratti and 
Stulz (2012) perform a cross-country comparison of financial institutions for the period 2007 
to 2008. They stress that banks with higher proportion of board ownership operate worse than 
banks with less board ownership. The reason being that  banks with boards of higher 




shareholder wealth. However, this policy left banks exposed to high risk and had a negative 
effect on bank performance. Based on the theoretical and empirical background presented 
above, we assume: 
H6: An increase of managerial ownership could have a positive impact on the US investment 
bank performance. 
 2.7. Operational complexity and bank performance 
Operational complexity denotes the variety of activities which are related to a  firm’s 
operations (Child, 1972). The higher the level of complexity is, the more apparent becomes 
the need of higher expertise and knowledge specific to the environment. This implies that co-
ordination problems between specialists rise which correspondingly increase communication 
costs of the firm (Lawrence and Lorch, 1967). Moreover, as complexity increases firms’ 
advisory needs increase as well (Adams and Mehran, 2012). This implies that firms might 
have more independent members in their boards so as to improve the expertise and 
knowledge to the firm. However, as director independency increases, the level of the 
attendance  and effort of independent members on board and committee meeting decreases, 
resulting in the increase of the free-riding problems that large banks suffer from (Jensen, 
1993). The above discussion shows that the association between operational complexity and 
performance could be negative after controlling for committee and board related variables, 
thus: 
H7: An increase of environmental complexity could have a negative impact on the US 
investment bank performance, after controlling for board and committee related variables. 
3. Data and preliminary analysis  
Our sample consists of the major 23 listed investment banks headquartered in the US with 
standard industry classification of 6211 and 6282. Our unbalanced panel dataset includes 203 
observations over the period 2000-2012. The data are collected from DEF 14A proxy 
statements,  10-K annual reports,  BANKSCOPE and Thomson Financial’s  Banker.  
The corporate governance data are hand collected from DEF 14A proxy statements of annual 
meetings found in the SECs EDGAR filings. Following previous studies (Pathan, 2009; 
Adams and Mehran 2013; Pathan and Faff, 2013) governance data are measured from the 
date of the proxy statement. Financial information on investment banks are firstly sourced 




and BANKSCOPE. We include only the listed investment banks as information on  corporate 
governance data are standardised through the SEC Edgar platform. Our main inclusion 
criterion is that we consider in the sample only financial institutions that their  main source of 
income consists of fees, commission and trading revenues reflecting in that way their 
distinctive operational nature.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Our corporate governance data comprise five general dimensions; board structure, CEO  
power, compensation of the CEO and TMT, ownership of CEO and board members and 
operational complexity measures. In particular, we account for three board characteristics, 
namely board size, board composition and gender diversity. The first two variables have been 
extensively used in the corporate governance literature (Adams and Mehran, 2008; Andres 
and Vallelado, 2008; Staikouras et al., 2007; Busta, 2007; Tanna et al., 2011). The first 
represents the number of members that constitute the board, while the second refers to the 
proportion of independent members in the board. Gender diversity is the percentage of 
females in the boardroom (Shrader et al. 1997; Campel and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Francoeur 
et al, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009).  
We employ two measures of  the CEO power; CEO duality and ‘internally’ hired CEO. CEO 
duality is a dummy that takes the value of 1  if the CEO chairs the board as well, and 0 
otherwise (Rechner and Dalton, 1989, 1991; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Daily and Dalton, 
1992, 1993; Daily, 1995; Boyd, 1995; Baliga et al., 1996; Dalton et al., 1998; Ballinger and 
Marcel, 2010). CEO ‘internally’ hired is a dummy variable which takes the value of one 1 if 
the CEO is either the founder or has been member of the board before being moved to the 
CEO position, otherwise it takes the value of zero (Adams et al., 2005; Pathan, 2009; 
Fahlenbrach 2009). As additional CEO characteristics, we control for the CEO tenure and the 
CEO age. The CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of the years that the CEO have served in 
the same position (Mishra and Nielsen, 2000; Cornett et al., 2008; Pathan and Faff, 2013). 
Finally, the CEO age is the natural logarithm of the age that the CEO has (Mishra and 
Nielsen, 2000; Cornett et al., 2008). 
In order to examine the impact of ownership on bank performance we use the number of 
shares hold by the CEO and TMT as the percentage of total outstanding number of bank’s 
shares (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Aebi et al., 2012). We also control for the cash short-term 




TMT (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). Moreover, we examine the impact of cash and equity 
compensation of CEO and TMT on investment bank performance. The natural logarithm of 
cash-based compensation includes the base salary and bonus while the natural logarithm of 
equity-based compensation includes restricted stock and stock options. Decomposition of the 
compensation has been used in a number of different studies so as to investigate differences 
on the impact of cash and equity compensation on firm performance (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990; Frye, 2004; Carpenter and Sanders, 2002). 
We also examine the impact of operational complexity on bank performance. Operational 
complexity is  proxied by the number of different business segments (Booth and Deli, 1999; 
Bushman et al., 2004; Linck et al., 2007) and subsidiaries (Adams and Mehran, 2012). 
Moreover, we control for the total outstanding number of board committees (Vafeas, 1999), 
the fees paid to the board committees and the number of audit committee meetings (Xie et al., 
2003; Goodwin‐Stewart and Kent, 2006). 
Turning to the rest of the bank-specific determinants, we opt for a number of additional 
variables such as the ratio of equity to total assets as a proxy of leverage (Berger and 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). We also use the ratio of other earning assets over  total assets in 
line with Beltratti and Stulz (2012) so as to capture the different nature of investment banks 
centered around equity issuance and underwriting activities. We also include the ratio of 
investment banking fees over total assets as this income reflects the main activity of 
investment banks (Radic et al., 2012). Lastly, we control for the insolvency risk, namely z-
score, estimated as in Boyd’s and Graham (1986).7 
In our analysis we account for the regulatory mandates with the introduction of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 (Pathan and Faff, 2009) as a dummy, which takes the value of 0 if 
year is 2000-2001 and the value of 1 otherwise. 8 We also impose a crisis dummy which takes 
the value of 1 if year is 2007-2010, 0 otherwise in order to account for the  financial crisis 
period (Pathan and Faff, 2009; De Jonghe et al., 2012). Finally, in order to capture the market 
risk  we use the Volatility Implied Index indicator (VIX). 9 This financial indicator suggests 
that higher levels of VIX reflect higher degrees of financial turmoil in US (Whaley, 2000). 
 
7 Z-score= (1+Average ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE. The z-score has been  used in recent banking studies 
(Lepetit et al., 2008; Radic et al., 2012). 
8 In particular, Section 301 of  SOX  Act obligates the audit committee to be comprised solely by independent 
members. 
9 VIX is the volatility implied index for Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index. For the data 





3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the corporate governance variables are provided in Table 2. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The sample mean of board size in Panel A of Table 2 is 8.30, which is similar to that of 10 in 
Coles et al. (2008) and 9 in Francis et al. (2012). Moreover, our sample mean of gender 
diversity of 0.11 is comparable to that of  0.076 in Pathan and Faff (2013). Turning to the 
CEO characteristics, the sample mean of CEO duality is 0.72 while that of CEO ‘internally’ 
hired is 0.65 which is similar to that of 0.58 in Pathan and Skully (2010). The CEO age 
sample mean is 55.35 (years), which is comparable to that of  56.26 in Cornett et al. (2009). 
Also, the mean tenure of the CEO is 7.74 (years), which is similar to that of 8.85 in Pathan 
and Skully (2010). With regards to the ownership, the sample mean of board ownership is 
12.27 %,  which is comparable to that of 10.25% in Pathan and Skully (2010) and to that of 
9.63% in Andershon and Fraser (2000). Our CEO ownership sample mean is 6.08% which is 
consistent to that reported (4.41%) by Pathan and Skully (2010). Our sample mean of the 
number of board committees is 3.32, which is consistent to that found (4.9) by Adams and 
Mehran (2003). Lastly, the sample mean of the total outstanding number of business segment 
is 3.04, which is comparable to that of 2.6 in Coles et al. (2008). 
In Panel B of Table 2 we present some descriptive statistics of control variables, namely 
E/TA,  FEES, EARN, Z-SCORE and VIX financial indicator. The sample mean of return on 
average equity, ROAE, in Panel C of  Table 2 is 8.02% which is similar to the sample mean 
of 9.92% in Pathan and Faff (2013). Their sample mean (4.65%) of return on average assets, 
ROAA, is comparable to ours (1.96%). Moreover, our mean efficiency score for US 
investment banks is 0.65, which is similar to the sample mean of 0.66 in Radic et al. (2012).  
Panel D shows an upward trend in the average percentage of independent members of the 
board over time, with a notable increase from 60% in 2003 to 69% in 2006. This increase is 
attributed to the independent board requirements imposed by SOX.  Lastly, the mean of CEO  
ownership has been sharply reduced from 6.39% in 2007 to 2.84% in 2008.  
4. Methodology 
Four alternative proxies of performance are employed to examine the relationship between 




return on average equity (ROAE). ROAA is estimated as the net income before interest and 
taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets. ROAE is computed as net 
income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity. These two 
financial ratios are standard  in the literature as measures of banks’ performance (Adams and 
Mehran, 2005; Pathan, 2009; Pathan and Faff, 2013). Moreover, we include pre-tax operating 
income (POI) as a percentage of the average total assets. Lastly, we also employ the 
parametric method of  stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to obtain profit efficiency scores as 
another proxy of investment banks performance (EFF).10  
 
Given the literature discussion, we opt the following fixed effect regression model in order to 
test our hypotheses: 
 
(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑎0 + 𝑎1(𝑃𝑆𝑂𝑋)𝑡 + 𝑎2(𝐶𝑅𝑆)𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗 ∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟 − 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1 +
𝛾𝑗 ∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑡
1
𝑗=1 ]                                                                                                  (1), 
 
where i signifies individual investment bank (i = 1,2,...,23) and t is the period that we cover (t 
= 2000,2001,. . . ,2012). α, β, γ are parameters to be estimated. 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. PSOX is 
a dummy variable which takes the value of 0 in the post SOX period (2000-2001) and 1 
otherwise. CRS is a crisis dummy that takes the value of 1 if year is 2007-2010, and 0 
otherwise. Corpor- Governance consists of five different dimensions of corporate governance 
variables 1) board size, board composition and gender diversity 2) CEO ‘internally’ hired, 
CEO duality, CEO age and CEO tenure 3) Cash and equity compensation of TMT and CEO 4) 
CEO/board ownership and CEO/TMT bonus as a percentage of total cash compensation  and 
5) number of business segments, number of subsidiaries, number of board committees, fees 
paid for the attendance of members in board committees and number of audit committee 
meetings. Perform is the dependent variable of the model and stands for the performance of 
investment banks estimated by ROAA , ROAE, POI and EFF. Control comprises a number of 
bank-specific and country level determinants.11 
 
We also employ the two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator (Arrelano and Bover 1995; Blundell 
and Bond, 1998). 12 This two-step estimates of standard errors are likely to be downward 
biased (Blundell and Bond, 1998) and hence we follow a finite sample correction introduced 
 
10 For a formal explanation of the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) see Appendix.  
11 For estimations that we employ EFF as a measure of  bank performance ,we exclude  from the regression 
models  FEES  and EARN control variables so as to avoid multicollinearity bias. For a formal exposition of the 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) see Appendix. 




by Windmeijer (2005). The estimates of the two-step system estimates are also tested via 
Hansen’s diagnostic test for instrument validity and the test for second-order autocorrelation 
of error terms introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991). This model includes as independent 
variable one lag of performance and hence equation (1) takes the following transformation: 
(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑎0 + 𝜑(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎1(𝑃𝑆𝑂𝑋)𝑡 + 𝑎2(𝐶𝑅𝑆)𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗 ∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟 −
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 ∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡
1
𝑗=1 ]                                                                                      (2) 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1.  Panel Fixed Effect Models 
Table 3 presents the results of the panel fixed effect analysis, where bank performance is a 
function of  bank-specific and country-level variables. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
With regard to the board size, we find a negative impact on performance at the 5% (Table 3, 
Model 1) and at the 10% level of significance (Table 3, Model 4). This result supports 
‘agency cost hypothesis’ by Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggesting that an increase in the 
members of the board could result in higher information asymmetry and communication costs. 
The effect of board size on investment bank performance remains negative (Table 3, Model 2 
and 3) where ROAA and POI are employed as performance measures, but the coefficients are 
not statistically significant from zero.  Regarding the board composition, we find that there is 
positive relationship between board independence and performance. The result is statistically 
significant at the 5% level (Table 3, Model 1, 3 and 4). The positive impact of board 
independence on bank performance is consistent with the ‘agency cost hypothesis’ by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and previous studies (Anderson and Reed, 2004; Busta, 2007; Andres 
and Vallelado, 2008; Tanna et al., 2011) and shows that independent directors could 
minimize managerial entrenchment risk through their expertise and objectivity in the decision 
making process. We also find a negative relationship between gender diversity in the 
boardroom and bank performance at the 5% level of significance (Table 3, Model 4). This 
result is consistent with the study of Shrader et al. (1997) and  implies that as female board 
members increase they reduce the opportunity of the inclusion of more skillful male directors. 
Concerning the CEO power, we find CEO duality to have a positive impact on performance 
at the 5% level of significance (Table 3, Models 5,6,7 and 8). This finding confirms the 




chairs the board would act as a good agent of the firm and would offer unity of direction and 
strong control resulting in the improvement of firm performance. Our finding is consistent 
with  a number of previous studies (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Boyd, 1995; Brickley et al., 
1997; He and Wang, 2009). Moreover, the fixed effect specifications reveal no robust 
empirical evidence between the association of the ‘internally’ hired CEO and performance. 
Also, we find some evidence of negative relationship between CEO tenure and bank 
performance at the 10% level of significance (Table 3, Model 6), as in the study of Haleblian 
and Finkelstein (1993). Finally, we also find that there is a negative effect of CEO age on 
bank efficiency at the 10% significance level (Table 3, Model 8). 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Concerning the impact of CEO and TMT compensation on performance, the results show 
some variation depending on the different kinds of compensation, i.e., cash or equity-based 
compensation. We find that cash TMT compensation has a negative impact on bank 
performance (at the 1% level, Table 4 Model 1 and 3) while equity compensation exerts a 
positive impact on performance (at the 10% level, Table 4 Model 2). These findings are not 
surprising since cash compensation does not create sufficient incentives to executives to 
increase corporate value while equity compensation constitutes long-term pay and could align 
better incentives between executives and shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1998). Similarly, 
the CEO equity compensation has a positive impact on bank performance at the 5% 
significant level (Table 4, Model 4) as in the previous studies of Harris and Raviv (1979) and 
Grossman and Hart (1983). In contrast to TMT’s findings, the CEO cash compensation 
asserts a positive relationship between pay and performance (at the 5% level of significance, 
Table 4 Model 1 and 3).  
With reference to the CEO ownership, we find that there is a positive impact of the latter on 
bank performance at the 10% level (Table 4, Model 5 and 8) and the 5% (Table 4, Model 6 
and 7) level of significance. Our findings support the idea that the partial ownership of CEO 
reduces the agency costs and aligns better shareholders’ and managers’ incentives resulting  
in a positive impact on bank performance (Murphy, 1999). On the contrary, we find that 
board ownership decreases bank performance (at the 1% level, Table 4 Model 5, at the 10% 
level, Table 4 Models 6 and 7 and at the 5% level, Table 4, Model 8).  In similar lines, 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Laeven and Levine (2009) find that banks with boards that 




Beltratti and Stulz (2012)  claim that board members with higher ownership position banks in 
a way that maximize shareholder value. However, this might have the adverse results as 
banks are exposed to high risk that could impact negatively on their performance. Moreover, 
we find that the TMT’s bonus as a percentage of total cash compensation has a positive 
impact at the 1% (Table 4, Model 5) and the 5% significance level (Table 4, Model 6) on 
performance. This result is comparable with that of Fahlenbrach and  Stulz (2011) as they 
find that banks that pay higher cash bonuses as a proportion of total compensation to their 
executives perform better that those that pay lower level of  bonuses over total compensation 
during the period of financial crisis. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Regarding the operational complexity,  we find that an increase in the number of subsidiaries 
reduces the performance (at the 1% level of significance, Table 5 Model 1). This implies that 
banks  that have high operational complexity operate less efficiently as co-ordination 
problems between specialists rise which correspondingly increase communication costs of the 
bank (Lawrence and Lorch, 1967, Adams and Mehran). The fixed effect specifications reveal 
that there is a clear negative relationship between the number of standing board committees 
and bank performance (at the 5% level of significance, Table 5, Models 1,2 and 4). This 
implies that although an  increase in the amount of task’ delegation from board to committees 
might reduce the time and effort that boards devote as a group of directors, this could very 
likely rise the amount of the resources that the board should divert for the supervision of the 
increased number of outstanding committees (Vafeas, 1999). Lastly, we find that fees paid to 
the board committees are negatively associated to performance at the 5% (Table 5, Model 1 
and 2) and 1% level of significance (Table 5 Model 3). 
Turning to the rest of the bank-specific variables, we find that equity over total assets has 
negative impact on the performance at the 5%  (Table 3 Model 1, 3 and 5; Table 4 Model 3,5 
and 6; Table 5 Model 3) and the 10% (Table 4 Model 7 and 8; Table 5 Model 4). Our finding 
is consistent with the ‘agency cost hypothesis’ by Jensen and Meckling (1976) which 
suggests than higher leverage (lower equity over total assets ratio) has a positive impact on 
bank performance. The reason being that higher leverage mitigate the agency costs from the 
outside equity that arise from the choice of investment (Myers, 1977), the risk of  bank 
liquidation (Harris and Raviv, 1990) and the undertaken risk (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 




positive impact on performance at the 10% (Table 5, Model 1) level of significance. Fees 
constitute the main source of income for investment banks, hence an increase of net income 
improve bank profitability (Beccalli, 2007; Micco et al., 2007; Lin and Yzhang, 2009). In 
addition, we find evidence that there is negative relationship between other earning assets 
over total assets ratio and investment bank performance at the 5% (Table 3 Model 1 and 3; 
Table 4 Model 3; Table 5 Model 1 and 3) and 10% (Table 3 Model 5; Table 4 Model 1,6 and 
7) level of significance. The negative coefficient suggests that  activities such as trading 
securities may induce higher risk of bank losses (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Lastly, 
we find that risk, proxied as z-score, shows that a decrease in risk has a strong positive effect 
on bank performance at the 1%  significance level (Table 3, Model 2,3,6 and 7; Table 4, 
Model 2,3 and 5; Table 5, Model 2 and 3). This result lends support to the ‘bad luck 
hypothesis’, suggesting that there exists a negative relationship between risk and performance 
(see Berger and De-Young, 1997).13  
We also find a strong negative effect of the VIX indicator on the performance, signifying that 
higher market volatility decreases performance which is consistent with previous studies 
(Boorke 1989; Miller and Noulas, 1997). Also, as it is expected, there is a negative impact of 
the financial crisis on investment bank performance (Pathan and Faff, 2013). Lastly, we find 
a strong negative impact of the PSOX period on performance, indicating that more  board 
independency reduces the level of meeting attendance of the independent board members 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2011), resulting in the increase of the free-riding problems that large 
banks suffer from (Jensen, 1993). 
5.2 Dynamic Panel Analysis 
Tables 6,7 and 8 present the results of the dynamic panel analysis. The appropriateness of the 
two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator is held by  the significant lag performance variable in all 
the corresponding models of Tables 6,7 and 8. Moreover, regarding basic diagnostics the test 
(AR(2)) for second-order autocorrelation in second differences and the Hansen J-statistics of 
over-identifying restrictions is insignificant (Tables 6,7 and 8). 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
13 The reasoning being that if an unexpected event  increases the risk of a  bank, the bank would start to spend 





With regard to the board size our results further support the ‘agency cost hypothesis’ by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and lends evidence for our fixed effect estimations. We find a 
strong negative impact of the board size on bank performance. The result remains robust  at 
the 1% level (Table 6, Models 2 and 3) and at the 1% (Table 6, Models 4 and 4) level of 
significance. In similar lines with fixed effect specifications, we find that CEO duality has a 
positive impact on bank performance at the 5% (Table 6 Model 5) and 10% significance level 
(Table 6 Model 8) which is consistent with the ‘stewardship hypothesis’ (Donaldson,1990; 
Barney, 1990). Although there is robust evidence to support that CEO duality has positive 
impact on bank performance, there is no empirical study to examine this relationship between 
the ‘internally’ hired CEO and bank performance. Our results show that there exists positive 
relationship between ‘internally’ hired CEO and bank performance (at the 1% level, Table 6 
Model 6; at the 5%, Table 6 Model 5 and 7).  
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Turning to the compensation-based variables, our results further support our fixed effect 
specification. We find a negative impact of cash-based compensation  of TMT on bank 
performance at the 10% level of significance (Table7 Model 1 and 2). Moreover, there exists 
a positive impact of equity compensation of TMT on bank performance at the 1% level of 
significance (Table 7, Model 2). As in previous section (5.1), we find that CEO cash 
compensation asserts a positive effect on investment bank performance  at the 1% level of 
significance (Table 7, Model 1 and 3). Lastly, our results show that the equity-based 
compensation has a positive impact on bank performance. The result remain robust at the 5% 
(Table 7 Model 1 and 2) and 10% (Table 7 Model 4) significance level. 
We also find that board ownership asserts a negative impact on bank performance at the 1% 
(Table 7 Model 5 and 6) and 5% (Table 7 Model 7). In similar lines with fixed effect 
specifications,  CEO ownership has a positive impact on performance at the 5% (Table 7 
Model 5) and 10% (Table 7 Model 7 and 8) significance level. Also, we find further evidence 
for the positive impact of CEO and TMT bonus as a percentage of total cash compensation on 
bank performance.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
The dynamic panel estimations lend further support on the negative impact of operational 
complexity on bank performance. We find that both an increase of the number of different 




performance. The results are robust at the 1% (Table 8, Model 2 and 3) and 5% (Table 8, 
Model 2) level of significance respectively. Also, we find additional evidence that an increase 
of the number of committees reduces  performance at the 10% (Table 8, Model 1,2 and 4) 
and 5% (Table 8, Model 3) significance level. 
In terms of the rest of the bank-specific determinants,  we find that an increase in leverage 
(decrease in the equity over total assets ratio) has a positive impact on performance. 
Consistent with fixed effect specifications, we find a positive impact of  investment banking 
fees  over total assets ratio on bank performance. Also, as in the previous section (5.1), the 
risk asserts a negative impact on bank performance which is consistent with the ‘bad luck 
hypothesis’ by Berger and De-Young (1997). The dynamic panel analysis provides additional 
evidence of the negative and significant impact of other earning assets over total assets ratio 
on performance. We also find that the VIX indicator has a negative effect on bank 
performance. Lastly, we observe that both the financial crisis and PSOX period has a 
negative  impact on investment bank performance.  
5.3 Dynamic Threshold Analysis 
In this section, we opt for the dynamic threshold methodology (Kremer et al., 2011) and 
investigate regime changes of  important corporate governance variables with respect to 
investment bank performance. 14 We employ this econometric technique for two of the key 
variables of our previous (5.1 & 5.2) analysis. These are the board size and board ownership 
that we find them to be negatively associated to the US investment bank performance.  
A study by Yemack et al. (1996) shows that there is a trade-off between advantages and 
disadvantages of large boards. On the one hand, large boards increase the monitoring and the 
expertise to deal with problems of the specific-firm environment. On the other hand, large 
boards decrease the control and the effective communication between the board members. 
Based on the above arguments,  we believe that  is essential to investigate regime changes of 
the board size effect on investment bank performance.  
 
Furthermore, agency theory underlies that an increase of the board ownership better aligns 
incentives between the managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Murphy, 1999). Hence, boards that hold higher ownership  are more likely to take 
decisions to increase the corporate value. However, our findings in the fixed and dynamic 
 




panel estimations indicate that an increase of board ownership decreases bank performance, 
as in Beltrazzi and Stulz (2011). To this end, the threshold analysis enable us to investigate, if 
and at which level, the board ownership asserts a positive impact on investment bank 
performance. 
  [INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]   
Our analysis finds a threshold value of the board size around ten.15 This threshold value splits 
the sample into two regimes. The low regime with banks that have board size lower than ten 
members and the high regime with banks of more than ten members in their boards. The 
results indicate that there is a  highly negative impact at the 1% level of the board size on 
investment bank performance for the high regime banks, as  λ2=-1.3778 (see Table 9). This 
finding is consistent with the ‘agency cost hypothesis’ by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Moreover, the threshold value indicates that the board size of the investment banks should be 
less than ten members which is similar to the argument of Lipton and Lorsch (1992) that 
suggest the restraining of the membership of boards to ten people, with a desired size of eight 
or nine members. Regarding the impact of the board size on bank performance for the low 
regime banks, we still find a negative coefficient but the result is not statistically significant. 
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
Moreover, Table 10 shows that the percentage of banks with large boards constantly 
increases and reaches the highest level (53%) in 2007. This implies that the majority of US 
investment banks underperformed  with an increase of their board size above the threshold 
value of 10 board members. After the burst of the financial crisis, we observe a sharp 
decrease (27%) of the proportion of investment banks that had large boards indicating the 
need of these financial institutions to decrease agency costs from the high information 
asymmetry that large boards caused in the period of the financial turmoil.  
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
Regarding the board ownership threshold analysis, we find a threshold value of 8.54312%. 
This value splits the sample into investment banks with boards that hold higher ownership 
(high regime) and  those with boards that hold lower ownership (low regime).  We find that 
for the banks in the low regime, an increase in the board ownership has a negative impact on 
performance at the 1% significance level (λ1=-0.026). This result is similar to that of our 
 
15 We use the natural logarithm of the board size to perform our estimation. The threshold value that is equal to 




fixed effect and dynamic panel estimations. However, it further reveals that the negative 
impact of board ownership refers only to banks that have lower levels of board ownership, 
that is below the threshold value. Turning to the high regime, which denotes banks of higher 
board ownership level, we find that there is a positive relationship between the board 
ownership and performance at the 5% level of significance (λ2=0.116). This result is 
confirmed by the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt,1989) and a number 
of previous studies that indicate a positive impact of the managerial ownership on firm 
performance (Kosnik, 1990; Malatesta et al., 1988; Pi and Timme,1993). 
[INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
Lastly, Table 12 shows that there is a constant increase over time in the percentage of banks 
that belong to the low regime which include banks with boards that hold lower levels of 
ownership. In the 2005-2007 period, we also observe that the majority of investment banks is 
classified in the high regime, indicating that during the financial crisis period investment 
banks opt to have high level of board ownership. 
6. Conclusion 
We find that there is a negative relationship between board size and performance. The 
threshold analysis reveals that this negative impact is enhanced when  board size increases 
above the critical value of ten board members. This implies that above a threshold value the 
rising costs of monitoring and communication deteriorates the performance of investment 
banks, consistent with the ‘agency cost hypothesis’ (Jensen, 1993). Adams and Mehran (2008) 
and Andres and Vallelado (2008) show that the impact of the board size on the performance 
of bank holding companies and commercial banks is found to be positive. Hence, investment 
banks appear to react differently compare to other banks with respect to the impact of board 
size on performance. Threshold analysis reveals that as a response to the 2007 crisis  most of  
investment banks scaled down their boards aiming to reduce agency conflicts that banks with 
large boards suffer from. Also, we  find evidence that the CEO power exerts a positive impact 
on bank performance which is consistent with the ‘stewardship hypothesis’ (Donaldson, 1990; 
Barney, 1990). This indicates that investment banks perform better when the CEO chairs the 
board or has a long-term relationship with the bank. Thus, investment banks could benefit 
from of the unity of control that the powerful CEO would offer. Our result sheds new light 
and provide an alternative view to Mishra and Nielsen (2000) who argue that the CEO power 




evidence of a negative association between operational complexity and performance. With 
regards to the ownership held by the board we find, similarly to Beltratti and Stulz (2012), 
that it has a negative impact on performance, predominantly present in banks with board 
ownership below a threshold value. On the contrary, the impact of board ownership, above a 
threshold value, on investment bank performance turns to positive. 
Our results, also in the light of the financial crisis, are of importance in particular for policy 
makers and market participants alike. In response to the severe financial crisis,  regulators in 
US passed the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), a major financial reform that have a significant 
impact on corporate governance along other aspects of financial markets. Future regulatory 
mandates could look at  the present evidence where investment bank performance rises with 
CEOs’ power and boards’ ownership above a threshold value. On the contrary, investment 
bank performance drops for boards with more than ten members and when there exists high 
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Table 1. Definitions of variables used in the fixed effect and dynamic panel estimations. 
Variables  Measures                     
Corporate governance (explanatory variables)            
Board size (BS) The number of members in the board  (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed effect and dynamic panel estimations)    
Board composition % (IND) The percentage of independent directors         
Gender diversity(GD) The percentage of female directors         
CEO ‘internally’ hired (CEOIN) A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is the founder or has a long term relationship with the bank, and 0 otherwise   
CEO duality (CEODUAL) A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO chairs the board as well, and 0 otherwise      
CEO tenure (CEOTEN) The number of years that the CEO has served in the position (we  use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)   
CEO age (CEOAGE) The age of the CEO (we use the natural logarithm, in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)     
Executives' Compensation (bonus &base salary) (EXECASH) The cash compensation of the top management team  which includes base salary and bonus (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations) 
Executives' Compensation (equity) (EXEEQ) The equity compensation of the top management team which includes restricted stock and stock options (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)  
CEO Compensation  (bonus &base salary) (CEOCASH) The cash compensation of the CEO which includes base salary and bonus (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)  
CEO Compensation (equity) (CEOEQ) The equity compensation of the CEO which includes restricted stock and stock options (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel)   
Executives' bonus incentive(EXEBON) The ratio of bonus over executives' total  cash compensation       
CEO's bonus incentive (CEOBON) The ratio of bonus over CEOs' total  cash compensation       
Board ownership % (BOARDOWN) The percentage shares that the directors hold        
CEO ownership % (CEOOWN) The percentage shares that the CEO holds         
Number of board committees (NBCOM) The number of board committees  (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)     
Fees paid for board meetings (FBCOM) Fees paid to directors for attending the board committees  (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)    
Number of audit committee meetings(NMAUD) Number of meetings of audit committee  (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)     
Number of Segments (SEG) Number of different business segments  (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)     
Number of Subsidiaries (SUBS) Number of subsidiaries (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)      
Performance measures (dependent variables)            
1. Return on average assets (ROAA) The net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets.     
2. Return on average equity (ROAE) The net income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity      
3. Pre-tax operating income (POI) The pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets       
4. Profit efficiency (EFF) Efficiency scores obtained from the SFA          
Other control variables            
Equity over total assets (E/TA) The ratio of equity over total asset         
Investment banking fees (FEES) The ratio of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets      
Other earnings assets (EARN) The ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets      
Risk to default (RISK) Z-score= (1+Average ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE        
Volatility Implied Index (VIX) Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index        
Post Sarbanes-Oxley Act   period (PSOX) A dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 and the value of 1 otherwise.       




Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the fixed effect and dynamic 
panel regressions. 
Notes: the Table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the fixed effect and dynamic panel regressions All the  
variables are in absolute values except the compensation determinants (EXECASH,EXEEQ,CEOCASH and CEOEQ)  which are in 
million dollars. BS: the number of members in the board; IND: the percentage of independent directors; GD: the percentage of female 
directors; CEOIN: a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is the founder or has a long term relationship with the bank, and 0 
otherwise; CEODUAL :a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO chairs the board as well, and 0 otherwise; CEOTEN: the 
number of years that the CEO has served in the position; CEOAGE: the age of the CEO; BOARDOWN: the percentage shares that 
the directors hold; CEOOWN: the percentage shares that the CEO holds; NBCOM: the number of board committees;  NMAUD: 
number of meetings of audit committee; FBCOM: fees paid to directors for attending the board committees; SEG: the  number of 
different business segments; SUBS: Number of subsidiaries; EXECASH: the cash compensation of the top management team  which 
includes base salary and bonus; EXEEQ: the equity compensation of the top management team which includes restricted stock and 
stock options; CEOCASH: the cash compensation of the CEO which includes base salary and bonus; CEOEQ: the equity 
compensation of the CEO which includes restricted stock and stock options; E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, 
commission and net trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over 
total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+AverageROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index); ROAE: net income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity; ROAA: net 
income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets;  POI: pre-tax operating income as a 
percentage of the average total assets; EFF: efficiency scores obtained from the SFA.  
Variables Mean SD     MIN MAX       Median 
Panel A: Corporate governance variables   
BS 8.3 3.5 5 16 9 
IND 0.66 0.25 0.4 0.92 0.71 
GD 0.11 0.1 0 0.44 0.11 
CEOIN 0.65 0.48 0 1 1 
CEODUAL 0.72 0.49 0 1 1 
CEOTEN 7.74 8.25 0 41 5 
CEOAGE 55.35 8.18 39 72 56 
BOARDOWN 12.27 15.43 0 67.21 6.68 
CEOOWN 6.08 8.59 0.01 55.71 1.83 
NBCOM 3.32 1.20 0 6 3 
FBCOM 0.31 1.031 0 1,25 0 
NMAUD 8.01 4.04 0 18 8 
SEG 3.04 1.76 0 8 3 
SUB 114.6 236.4 0 1255 15 
EXECASH 16,500 20,700 0 139,000 7,897 
EXEEQ 20,100 30,300 0 209,000 7,234 
CEOCASH 4,303 6,063 0 41,200 1,950 
CEOEQ 5,720 8,219 0 42,400 1,356 
Panel B: Bank-specific and country level variables     
E/TA  0.2324 0.2456 0.0105 0.97 0.1022 
FEES  0.4703 0.8905 0.0004 5.21 0.0676 
EARN  0.6094 0.3765 0.0001 3.756 0.6638 
RISK  3.0961 6.3524 -42.59 52.82 2.1066 
VIX   20.97 7.5946 11.56 40 21.68 
Panel C: Bank performance measures       
ROAE  8.02 29.77     -305.05 122.82 8.97 
ROAA  1.96 11.73       -50.6 72.97 0.74 
POI  3.32 14.99   -63.15 91.17 0.99 
EFF   0.65 0.39    0.12 0.97 0.78 
      
Panel D: Year by year corporate governance variables   
Year   BS IND CEODUAL CEOOWN BOARDOWN 
2000   8.7 0.66 0.80 6.78 10.40 
2001   8.2 0.65 0.92 5.68 9.75 
2002   7.8 0.60 0.87 6.92 9.89 
2003   7.4 0.60 0.80 6.91 11.11 
2004   8.9 0.69 0.87 7.97 9.23 
2005   8.5 0.68 0.81 7.45 9.64 
2006   9.0 0.69 0.83 7.30 13.57 
2007   8.5 0.66 0.82 6.39 14.20 
2008   8.1 0.64 0.60 2.84 13.05 
2009   8.4 0.66 0.59 7.35 14.84 
2010   8.1 0.66 0.56 5.27 12.91 
2011   8.0 0.66 0.47 4.08 14.57 





















Notes: the Table reports the regression results based on a fixed effect model over the period 2000 to 2012. The dependent variable is the performance of investment banks 1) ROAE: net income after tax as a percentage of 
the average book value of total equity; 2)ROAA: net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets; 3)POI: pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets; 
4)EFF: efficiency scores obtained from the SFA. As independent variables we employ BS: the number of members in the board; IND: the percentage of independent directors; GD: the percentage of female directors; 
CEOIN: a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is the founder or has a long term relationship with the bank, and 0 otherwise; CEODUAL :a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO chairs the board as well, and 
0 otherwise; CEOTEN: the number of years that the CEO has served in the position; CEOAGE: the age of the CEO; E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total 
assets; EARN: ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+AverageROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-
2001 and the value of 1 otherwise; CRS: a  dummy which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007-2010; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index).  For Volatility Implied Index data 
(VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) we use Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyze correlations of all the selected variables. We check that 
there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.
          Board     Structure    CEO     Characteristics   
VARIABLES ROAE(1) ROAA(2) POI(3)              EFF(4) ROAE(5) ROAA(6) POI(7) E      EFF (8) 
         
E/TA -0.353** -0.131 -0.613** -0.374 -0.368** -0.244 -0.346 -0.103 
 (0.161) (0.113) (0.240) (0.365) (0.171) (0.196) (0.283) (0.154) 
EARN -0.0183**              0.0167 -0.0370** - -0.0205* 0.0110 0.000483 - 
 (0.00847) (0.0165) (0.0160)  (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.00435)  
FEES -0.0132 -0.0252 0.00716 - 0.0120 -0.00809 0.00979 - 
 (0.0171) (0.0152) (0.00861)  (0.0318) (0.0105) (0.0123)  
RISK 0.000997 0.00263*** 0.0164*** 0.000113 0.00213 0.00158*** 0.00283*** 0.000554 
 (0.00199) (0.000521) (0.00496) (0.00127) (0.00240) (0.000495) (0.000497) (0.00109) 
PSOX -0.0910*** -0.0307*** -0.0262* -0.125*** -0.0374** -0.0203* -0.0149 -0.144*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0109) (0.0133) (0.0346) (0.0144) (0.0108) (0.0103) (0.0431) 
VIX -0.00474*** -0.00209** -0.00110** -0.00447* -0.00354** -0.00151** -0.000778 -0.00323 
 (0.00120) (0.000960) (0.000518) (0.00248) (0.00165) (0.000692) (0.000685) (0.00257) 
CRS -0.0605* -0.0185* -0.0262* 0.0868* 0.0464 0.0138 0.0107 0.0286 
 (0.0313) (0.0106) (0.0128) (0.0451) (0.0356) (0.00969) (0.0148) (0.0343) 
BS -0.0360** -0.0205 -0.0238 -0.0548* - -   
 (0.0167) (0.0193) (0.0298) (0.0290)   - - 
IND 0.141** 0.0251** 0.0238** -0.0294 - -   
 (0.0502) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0214)   - - 
GD 0.0575 0.00110 -0.00240 -0.616** -    
 (0.0373) (0.0258) (0.0174) (0.236)  - - - 
    (0.236)     
CEODUAL                                
 
CEOAGE 













 - - - - (0.0175) (0.0326) (0.0568) (0.00773) 
CEOTEN     -0.0217 -0.00807* -0.00754 0.00191 
 - - - - (0.0175) (0.00409) (0.00655) (0.00520) 









 (0.161) (0.0628) (0.0790) (0.309) (0.587) (0.140) (0.318) (0.354) 
F-test 10.14*** 7.85***    62.93***    39.64*** 5.60*** 9.21*** 16.34*** 2.48* 
Observations 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R-squared 0.236 0.286 0.410 0.193 0.204 0.237 0.352 0.171 










Notes: the Table reports the regression results based on a fixed effect model over the period 2000 to 2012. The dependent variable is the  performance of investment banks 1) ROAE: net income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of 
total equity; 2)ROAA: net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets; 3)POI: pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets; 4)EFF: efficiency scores obtained from the SFA. As 
independent variables we employ  EXECASH: the cash compensation of the top management team  which includes base salary and bonus; EXEEQ: the equity compensation of the top management team which includes restricted stock and stock 
options; CEOCASH: the cash compensation of the CEO which includes base salary and bonus; CEOEQ: the equity compensation of the CEO which includes restricted stock and stock options; BOARDOWN: the percentage shares that the directors 
hold; CEOOWN: the percentage shares that the CEO holds; EXEBON: bonus over executives' total  cash compensation; CEOBON:  bonus over CEOs' total  cash compensation; E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net 
trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+AverageROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 
and the value of 1 otherwise; CRS: a  dummy which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007-2010; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index).  For Volatility Implied Index data (VIX-Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index) we use Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables 
used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
         Compensation    Ownership   
VARIABLES ROAE(1) ROAA(2)        POI(3)   EFF(4) ROAE(5) ROAA(6)    POI(7)          EFF(8) 
E/TA       -0.338 -0.121 -0.521** -0.308 -1.008** -0.580** -0.357* -0.322* 
 (0.536) (0.133) (0.208) (0.206) (0.363) (0.246) (0.183) (0.161) 
EARN -0.0178* -0.00262 -0.00947** - -0.0151 -0.0210* -0.0155*  
 (0.00885) (0.00340) (0.00445)  (0.0213) (0.0104) (0.00808)  
FEES -0.0136 0.00509 0.00747 - 0.0108 0.0155 0.000524  
 (0.0217) (0.00863) (0.00925)  (0.0354) (0.0114) (0.00758)  
RISK 0.00210 0.00310*** 0.0183*** 0.000635 0.0860*** 0.0134* -0.0146 -0.000121 
 (0.00219) (0.000644) (0.00478) (0.00130) (0.0271) (0.00668) (0.00858) (0.00124) 
PSOX -0.0700** -0.0224* -0.0236 -0.177*** 0.00134 -0.00273*** -0.00163*** -0.00500 
 (0.0301) (0.0127) (0.0175) (0.0389) (0.00193) (0.000418) (0.000464) (0.00329) 
VIX -0.00238* -0.00128* -0.000620 -0.00235 -0.00299* -0.000470 -0.00142* 0.0642* 
 (0.00117) (0.000659) (0.000692) (0.00228) (0.00173) (0.000552) (0.000774) (0.0369) 
CRS 0.0223 -0.00121 0.0116 0.0400 -0.0541** 0.0130 -0.0208* 0.0421 
 (0.0293) (0.0186) (0.0124) (0.0352) (0.0240) (0.00929) (0.0109) (0.0329) 
EXECASH -0.0389*** -0.00241 -0.00504*** 0.0012 - -    - - 
 (0.0109) (0.00495) (0.00156) (0.0012)     
EXEEQ 0.00483 0.00169* -7.27e-05 -0.00965 - -   - - 
 (0.00341) (0.000953) (0.000645) (0.00691)     
















   - 
 
 (0.00250) (0.000386) (0.000355) (0.00148)    - 
BOARDOWN - - - - -0.00160*** -0.000923* -0.00133* -0.00597** 
     (0.000516) (0.000505) (0.000650) (0.00289) 
CEOOWN -                 -          - - 0.00340* 0.00206** 0.00164** 0.00689** 
     (0.00170) (0.000802) (0.000608) (0.00340) 
EXEBON -          -           - - 0.00680*** 0.000700** 0.000382 0.00565 
     (0.00101) (0.000308) (0.000267) (0.00435) 
CEOBON -          -           - - 0.00122 -6.61e-05 -8.72e-05 -0.000482 
     (0.000174) (4.71e-05) (4.21e-05) (0.000374) 
Constant -0.453* 0.0240 -0.218*** 0.854*** 0.211*** 0.0257 0.0490* 0.866*** 
 (0.247) (0.243) (0.0709) (0.135) (0.0538) (0.0164) (0.0243) (0.111) 
F-test 17.98*** 5.79*** 3.71*** 3.93*** 27.61*** 6.87*** 18.07*** 3.73*** 
Observations 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R-squared 0.301 0.262 0.395 0.105 0.350 0.404 0.263 0.144 








Table 5. Fixed effect panel regressions  over the period 2000 to 2012 for US investment bank performance (governance complexity) 
  Governance Complexity   
VARIABLES          ROAE(1) ROAA(2)      POI(3)                EFF(4) 
E/TA       -0.718 -0.150 -0.7454** -0.322* 
 (0.519) (0.125) (0.3360) (0.161) 
EARN -0.0280** 0.0154 -0.04130**  
 (0.0129) (0.0149) (0.0178) - 
FEES 0.0629* -0.0165 -0.0585 - 
 (0.0335) (0.0136) (0.0991)  
RISK 0.00152 0.00303*** 0.0017*** -0.000121 
 (0.00207) (0.000581) (0.0045) (0.00124) 
VIX -0.00508*** -0.00197* -0.00987* -0.00500 
 (0.00118) (0.000959) (0.00528) (0.00329) 
CRS -0.0686** 0.0175 -0.3128** -0.0642* 
 (0.0322) (0.0112) (0.1404) (0.0369) 
PSOX -0.0698*** -0.0263*** -0.2084** -0.123** 
 (0.0206) (0.00821) (0.0865) (0.0460) 
NBCOM -0.0194** -0.0262** 0.0473 -0.240** 
 (0.00859) (0.0123) (0.0807) (0.115) 
NMAUD 0.00103 0.00320 -0.00592 -0.0292 
 (0.00358) (0.00324) (0.0108) (0.0390) 
FBCOM -0.029** -0.0401** -0.04797*** 0.0347 
 (0.0104) (0.0181) (0.0108) (0.0430) 
SEG 0.0162 -0.0172 -0.0131 0.00761 
 (0.0211) (0.0279) (0.0157) (0.0905) 
SUB -0.00217*** -0.00280 -0.00265 0.0130 
 (0.00062) (0.00282) (0.00293) (0.0140) 
Constant 0.0257 0.139** 0.137 1.201*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0658) (0143) (0.179) 
F-test 17.30*** 14.98*** 6.70*** 5.37*** 
Observations 203 203 203 203 
R-squared 0.404 0.334 0.472 0.185 
Number of banks 23 23 23 23 
Notes: the Table reports the regression results based on a fixed effect model over the period 2000 to 2012. The dependent variable is the performance of investment banks 1) ROAE: net income after 
tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity; 2)ROAA: net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets; 3)POI: pre-tax operating income as 
a percentage of the average total assets; 4)EFF: efficiency scores obtained from the SFA. As independent variables we employ NBCOM: the number of board committees;  NMAUD: number of 
meetings of audit committee; FBCOM: fees paid to directors for attending the board committees; SEG: the  number of different business segments; SUBS: Number of subsidiaries; E/TA: equity over 
total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= 
(1+AverageROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 and the value of 1 otherwise; CRS: a  dummy which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007-
2010; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index).  For Volatility Implied Index data (VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) we use 
Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between 







Table 6. Dynamic panel regressions over the period 2000 to 2012 for US investment bank performance (board structure and CEO characteristics) 
Notes: the Table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the period 2000 to 2012. The dependent variable is the performance of investment banks 1) ROAE: net income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity; 2)ROAA: net income before 
interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets; 3)POI: pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets; 4)EFF: efficiency scores obtained from the SFA. As independent variables we employ BS: the number of members in the 
board; IND: the percentage of independent directors; GD: the percentage of female directors; CEOIN: a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is the founder or has a long term relationship with the bank, and 0 otherwise; CEODUAL :a dummy that takes the value of 1 
if the CEO chairs the board as well, and 0 otherwise; CEOTEN: the number of years that the CEO has served in the position; CEOAGE: the age of the CEO; E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio 
of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+AverageROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 and the value of 1 otherwise; CRS: a  dummy which takes the value of 
1 if year is 2007-2010; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index).  For Volatility Implied Index data (VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) we use Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems with the 
selected variables, we first analyze correlations of all the selected variables.  
            Board     Structure      CEO     Characteristics   
VARIABLES ROAE(1)          ROAA(2)      POI(3)    EFF(4)  ROAE(5) ROAA(6) POI(7) EFF(8) 
Lag performance 0.3539** 0.3405** 0.3612*** 0.986*** 0.2088** 0.1874** 0.4721** 0.976*** 
 (0.1426) (0.1664) (0.1207) (0.142) (0.0906) (0.087) (0.1974) (0.178) 
E/TA 0.3842 -0.5491** -0.1291 -0.00016     -1.412*** -0.5543** -0.6541** 0.00143 
 (0.4728) (0.2332) (0.0916) (0.00052) (0.268) (0.2681) (0.2962) (0.00119) 
EARN -0.0312 -0.0595*** 0.0470 - 0.0319 -0.0317** -0.0115  
 (0.0406) (0.0205) (0.0387)  (0.0420) (0.0178) (0.0207) - 
FEES -0.0515 0.0240 0.0611** - 0.5491*** 0.3566 -0.0019  
 (0.0674) (0.0486) (0.0287)  (0.131) (0.297) (0.0415) - 
RISK 0.0007 -0.0007 0.0024 -3.15e-06 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0056  
 (0.0097) (0.004) (0.0037) (9.49e-06) (0.0047) (0.0034) (0.0035) 0.0005 
PSOX -0.0959** -0.0397*** 0.0398 0.00016 -0.0564*** -0.0981*** -0.0460 (0.0013) 
 (0.0477) (0.0151) (0.0347) (0.0001) (0.0161) (0.0272) 0.0750 -0.000135** 
VIX -0.0079** -0.0043*** -0.0066** -0.0000* -0.0063** -0.0067** 8.38e-06 (0.00059) 
 (0.0031) (0.0011) 0.0033 (9.77e-06) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.00590) -0.00008* 
CRS -0.0906* -0.0647** -0.0942* -0.0001** 0.0320 0.0431 -0.1286*** (0.00004) 
 (0.0498) (0.0329) (0.0562) (0.00005) (0.0136) (0.3281) (0.0429) 0.00092 
BS 0.01922 -0.0316*** -0.5018*** -0.00017* - - - - 
 (0.0351) (0.0096) (0.1815) (0.0001)     
IND 0.2335 -0.0468 -0.2072 -0.00033 - - - - 
 (0.3347) (0.1247) (0.2235) (0.00051)     
GD 0.1131 0.0031 0.0855 0.0000 - - - - 
















 - - - - (0.2703) (0.3716) (0.2737) (0.0105) 
CEOTEN     -0.1493 0.3609 -0.0030 0.00015 
 - - - - (0.0705) (0.3522) (0.0267) (0.00012) 
CEOIN - - - - 0.3960** 0.1759*** 0.183** 0.0012 
     (0.1875) (0.0635) (0.079) (0.0019) 
Constant -0.1441 0.3732*** 1.195*** -0.0011 -0.1271 0.5608 0.2348 0.00749 
 (0.3266) (0.0830) (0.3613) (0.0007) (1.465) (1.545) (1.141) (0.0404) 
Wald chi2 216.22*** 94.41*** 335.68*** 479.25***      133478.85*** 73.56*** 68.30*** 145.39*** 
AR(1) test stat -2.10** 1.69* -1.69* -2.27** -1.96* 2.03** -1.72* -2.18** 
AR(2) test stat 0.95 0.35 -0.32 -0.15 0.26 0.63 -1.03 -0.23 
Hansen J-stat 1 0.675 0.907 0.482 0.674 0.984 0.889 0.897 
Instruments 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 















Notes: the Table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the period 2000 to 2012. The dependent variable is the  performance of investment banks 1) ROAE: net income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity; 2)ROAA: 
net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets; 3)POI: pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets; 4)EFF: efficiency scores obtained from the SFA. As independent variables we 
employ  EXECASH: the cash compensation of the top management team  which includes base salary and bonus; EXEEQ: the equity compensation of the top management team which includes restricted stock and stock options; CEOCASH: the cash 
compensation of the CEO which includes base salary and bonus; CEOEQ: the equity compensation of the CEO which includes restricted stock and stock options; BOARDOWN: the percentage shares that the directors hold; CEOOWN: the percentage 
shares that the CEO holds; EXEBON: bonus over executives' total  cash compensation; CEOBON:  bonus over CEOs' total  cash compensation; E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; 
EARN: ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+AverageROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 and the value of 1 otherwise; CRS: a  
dummy which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007-2010; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index).  For Volatility Implied Index data (VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) we use Bloomberg 
database. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyze correlations of all the selected variables.  
 
          Compensation    Ownership   
VARIABLES ROAE(1) ROAA(2)   POI(3) EFF(4) ROAE(5) ROAA(6) POI(7) EFF(8) 
Lag Performance 0.3789** 0.4266*    0.3098***  0..954*** 0.2074* 0.4392*** 0.2592** 0.972*** 
 (0.1919) (0.2245) (0.0779) (0.153) (0.1142) (0.0955) (.1090) (0.148) 
E/TA -1.956*** -0.3703* 0.0988 0.0007 -0.0118 -0.1747*** -0.4124** -0.000693* 
 (0.750) (0.2125) (0.0607) (0.0010) (0.2461) (0.0642) (0.2001) (0.000413) 
EARN -0.0377 -0.0117 -0.0555 - -0.0446*** -0.0255**** -0.0616*** - 
 (0.084) (0.0242) (0.0926)  (0.0169) (0.0086) (0.0138)  
FEES -0.0225 0.0079 -0.0059 - 0.0554* 0.0262* 0.0924*** - 
 (0.0505) (0.0440) (0.0200)  (0.0278) (0.0152) (0.0175)  
RISK 0.0102* 0.0023 0.0018 0.00078 0.0088 0.0028 -0.0041 0.00006 
 (0.0058) (0.00256) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0117) (0.0019) (0.0119) (0.0005) 
PSOX 0.0296 -0.0455 -0.035** 0.00092 -0.0952 -0.0538 -0.1125 0.00011 
 (0.0435) (0.1178) (0.015) (0.0022) (0.1036) (0.0766) (0.1306) (0.0003) 
VIX -0.0045* -0.0026 0.0010 0.00040 -0.0066 -0.0107*** -0.0122*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.0024) (0.00225) (0.0031) (0.00027) (0.0058) (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0000) 
CRS -0.1245** 0.0534 -0.064* -0.00066*** -0.1408***  -0.1020*** 0.0500 -0.0001*** 
 (0.0624) (0.0543) (0.0362) (0.00002) (0.0360) (0.0313) (0.1102) (0.0000) 
EXECASH -0.0483* -0.1121* 0.0215 -0.00016 - -    - - 
 (0.0265) (0.0629) (0.07055) (0.0003)     
EXEEQ -0.01853 0.0072*** -0.0089 0.000278 - -   - - 
 (0.0117) (0.00270) (0.0146) (0.0005)     
















   - 
 
 (0.0031) (0.0052) (0.0029)           (0.000184)    - 
BOARDOWN - - - - -0.0092*** -0.0042*** -0.0081** 0.00002 
     (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0040) (0.00003) 
CEOOWN -                 -          - - 0.0118** 0.0021 0.0100* 0.00005* 
     (0.0055) (.0021) (0.0056) (0.00003) 
EXEBON -          -           - - -0.0060 -0.0182 0.0464* 0.00001*** 
     (0.0331) (0.0146) (0.0277) (0.0000) 
CEOBON -          -           - - -0.0053 0.0024 0.0132 0.00001** 
     (0.0441) (0.0096) (0.0181) (0.0000) 
Constant 0.8893 0.2944 0.129 1.72*** 0.2622 0.4694*** 0.3653 -2.80*** 
 (0.6705) (0.2165) (0.796) (0.335) (0.3894) (0.1559) (0.3599) (0.0981) 
Wald chi2 324.86*** 52.12*** 424.60*** 412.24*** 464.92*** 253.27*** 2979.09*** 470.30*** 
AR(1) test stat -1.72* -1.86* -2.04* -2.20** -2.16** -1.97*** -2.32** 2.08** 
AR(2) test stat -0.06 0.26 -0.52 -0.73 -0.21           0.06 -1.44 0.14 
Hansen J-stat 0.829 0.595 0.252 0.286 0.522 1 0.516 0.961 
Instruments 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 





Table 8. Dynamic panel regressions over the period 2000 to 2012 for US investment bank performance (governance complexity) 
  Other    Governance   characteristics   
VARIABLES         ROAE(1)        ROAA(2)        POI(3)                 EFF(4) 
Lag performance 0.1844*** 0.2800*** 0.2229* 0.9762*** 
 (0.0676) (0.1077) (0.1180) (0.119) 
E/TA       0.2205                        -0.4860** -0.8901** -0.0026* 
 (0.4529) (0.2027) (0.3852) (0.0014) 
EARN 0.0114 0.0162 -0.0444 - 
 (0.0104) (0.0377) (0.066)  
FEES 0.0178 -0.0369 0.0172 - 
 (0.0208) (0.0237) (0.0624)  
RISK 0.0192*** 0.0040 0.0019 0.0000* 
 (0.0069) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.00001) 
VIX -0.0028 -0.0008 -0.0072*** -0.00003*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.00001) 
CRS -0.1503*** -0.0555** -0.1187** -0.00019*** 
 (0.0425) (0.0263) (0.0517) (0.00006) 
PSOX -0.0914*** -0.0337 -0.0213            -0.00024* 
 (0.0275) (0.033) (0.0481) (00014) 
NBCOM -0.2694* -0.2261* -0.1477** -0.00061* 
 (0.1571) 0.1296 (0.0714) (0.00036) 
NMAUD 0.1732*** 0.0405 -0.0102 0.00010 
 (0.0553) (0.0492) (0.0495) (0.00009) 
FBCOM 0.00039 -0.0011 -0.7538* 0.00021 
 (0.00565) (0.0128) (0.444) (0.0015) 
SEG 0.0312 -0.1873*** -0.2296*** -0.0003 
 (0.0859) (0.0491) (0.0872) (0.00025) 
SUB -0.0460 -0.02873** 0.0653 0.00011 
 (0.0344) (0.0137) (0.0412) (0.00008) 
 -0.3371 -0.0025 0.7851*** -0.002** 
Constant (0.3374) (0.1744) (0.2867) (0.0009) 
Wald chi2 83.71*** 554.62*** 218.11*** 479.23*** 
AR(1) test stat -2.27** -1.67* -1.91* -2.03** 
AR(2) test stat -0.37 -0.45 -0.14 0.51 
Hansen J-stat 0.747 0.517 0.738 0.744 
Instruments 23 23 23 23 
Observations 184 184 184 184 
Number of banks 23 23 23 23 
Notes: the Table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the period 2000 to 2012. The dependent variable is the performance of investment banks 1) ROAE: net income 
after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity; 2)ROAA: net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets; 3)POI: 
pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets; 4)EFF: efficiency scores obtained from the SFA. As independent variables we employ NBCOM: the 
number of board committees;  NMAUD: number of meetings of audit committee; FBCOM: fees paid to directors for attending the board committees; SEG: the  number of 
different business segments; SUBS: Number of subsidiaries; E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; EARN: 
ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+AverageROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the 
value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 and the value of 1 otherwise; CRS: a  dummy which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007-2010; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Volatility Index).  For Volatility Implied Index data (VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) we use Bloomberg database. To avoid 




Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model where we use all the available instruments. 
Each regime has at least 5% of the observations (Hansen, 1999). The threshold value of Board size variable for banks range 
between 2.1972 and 2.3973. We denote as dependent variable banks’ ROAE ([𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡), while as the threshold and the 
regime dependent variable we impose the BS (𝐵𝑆 𝑖𝑡), which represents the natural logarithm of banks’ board size. We assume 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 includes a number of explanatory variables. IND: the percentage of independent directors; GD: the percentage of female 
directors;  E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio 
of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+AverageROE)/Standard 
Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 and the value of 1 otherwise; VIX: 
Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index). Following Bick (2007), the model accounts for 

















Table 9. Board size and performance 
Investment banks 
Threshold estimate 
BS  2.30259 
95% confidence interval ( 2.197220 -2.397900) 
Impact of board size                           S.E                                      
λ1                  -0.0524 0.0461 
λ2                 -1.3778*** 0.4162 
Impact of covariates   S.E 
E/TA -0.538 0.505 
RISK 0.0017 0.002 
EARN -0.0302** 0.0124 
FEES 0.0459* 0.0246 
IND  0.1314 0.1051 
GD -0.0951 0.157 
PSOX -0.0741** 0.0336 
VIX -0.0042*** 0.0011 
δ -0.5948*** 0.1637 
Observations 184   
Low regime 117  




Table 10.Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of investment banks into the two identified 
regimes based on threshold value of Board size. 
Threshold: Board size                       
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011 
Low regime 70% 62% 64% 64% 67% 56% 56% 47% 73% 65% 75% 73% 62% 
High regime 30% 38% 36% 36% 33% 44% 44% 53% 27% 35% 25% 27% 38% 
Notes:  Table shows the classification of the investment banks based on the Board size (natural logarithm) threshold value that 

















































95% confidence interval ( 0.276317-23.428200) 
Impact of Board ownership                           S.E                                      
λ1 -0.026*** 0.0074 
λ2 0.116** 0.0530 
Impact of covariates   S.E 
E/TA -0.4462 0.3796 
RISK 0.0022* 0.0012 
EARN -0.0163 0.0107 
FEES 0.0423** 0.0205 
CEOOWN 0.0055** 0.0026 
EXEBON 0.0069*** 0.0008 
CEOBON -0.0017*** 0.0002 
PSOX -0.0716** 0.0312 
VIX -0.0021* 0.0011 
δ -0.0006 0.0010 
Observations 184   
Low regime 94  
High regime 90   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model where we use all the available instruments. 
Each regime has at least 5% of the observations (Hansen, 1999). The threshold value of Board ownership variable for banks 
range between 0.276317 and 23.4282. We denote as dependent variable banks’ ROAE ([𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡), while as the threshold 
and the regime dependent variable we impose the BOARDOWN (𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 𝑖𝑡), which represents the percentage of 
bank’s shares hold by the board members. We assume 𝑚𝑖𝑡 includes a number of explanatory variables.  Following Bick 
(2007), the model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). CEOOWN: the percentage shares that the CEO holds; 
EXEBON: bonus over executives' total  cash compensation; CEOBON:  bonus over CEOs' total  cash compensation; E/TA: 
equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio of trading 
securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+AverageROE)/Standard Deviation of 
ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 and the value of 1 otherwise; VIX: Volatility Implied 

















Table 12.Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of investment banks into the two identified 
regimes based on threshold value of Board ownership. 
Threshold: Board ownership                     
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011 
Low regime 70% 69% 50% 57% 53% 50% 44% 47% 53% 35% 50% 53% 46% 
High regime 30% 31% 50% 43% 47% 50% 56% 53% 47% 65% 50% 47% 54% 
Notes:  Table shows the classification of the investment banks based on the Board ownership threshold value that we obtained 















































A.1. Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) has been widely employed to all kind of industries and 
especially banking since its  introduction by Aigner et al. (1977).16 We use the fixed-effect 
specification where efficiency scores are independently and identically distributed (Greene, 
2002). 
More specifically, we use the following specification for the profit frontier: 
     𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                               (3)            
where 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 is pre-tax profits for bank i in year t.17  𝑃𝑖𝑡 is a vector of input prices,  𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector of outputs, 𝑁𝑖𝑡 is a vector of fixed netputs. The term vi,t stands for the error term, 
while ui,t  is bank inefficiency.   
The translog profit function, opted in the paper, takes the form: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 1 2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗,𝑡 +
𝑗𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖
 
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 1 2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡 +
𝑗𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑖
 
+ ∑ ∑ 𝜅𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇1𝑡 + 1 2⁄ 𝜇2𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝜈𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝜉𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑖
 
+𝑢𝑖,𝑡 ± 𝑣𝑖,𝑡                           (4) 
Ordinary linear homogeneity and symmetry limitations are employed. We estimate equation 





                                                            and  𝛽 = 𝜎𝑢
2 𝜎𝜀
2⁄ .                              (5) 
Following Sealey and Lindley (1977) we employ the ‘intermediation’ approach so as to 
identify bank inputs and outputs. This approach assumes that banks use labour and capital in 
order to collect funds and transform them into loans and other earning assets. Hence, as inputs 
we employ the price of labour and physical capital.  The price of labour is measured as the 
 
16 SFA starts with a profit function  and evaluate the maximum profit frontier for the sample of banks. The 
advantage of this parametric methodology is that both the random error and inefficiency are combined in a 
composite error term (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
17 In order to deal with negative values of profits we follow the approach suggested by Bos and Koetter (2011). 
In particular, negative values of profits are replaced by the value of 1 in the left had side, while simultaneously 
we use a new variable, namely negative profit indicator at the right hand side. This indicator in case of losses 
takes the absolute value of negative profits while in case of positive profits takes the value of 1. 
18  We estimate bank-specific efficiency scores using the distribution of efficiency term conditional to the 





ratio of personnel expenses to total assets while the price of physical capital is measured as 
the ratio of operating expenses to fixed assets. Moreover, as the first output we use other 
earning assets that include trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds. Given the 
operational nature of investment banks,  we  use as a second output the total level of 
investment banking fees  that include net commission, fees and trading gains (Radic et al., 
2012). As a fixed netput, we use the total level of fixed assets. 
 
A.2. Dynamic Panel Threshold Model 
The dependent variable employed in the dynamic threshold technique is the performance 
measure ,ROAE, of investment banks. We use this econometric technique as it allows us to 
detect regime shifts of two corporate governance determinants, namely board size and board 
ownership, with respect to the performance of investment banks.19 
Therefore our equation takes the following specification: 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜆1𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝐼(𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝛿1𝛪(𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝜆2𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝐼(𝑞𝑖𝑡 > 𝛾) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   (6)         
where performit is the dependent variable (ROAE) and  μ is the bank-specific fixed effect 
parameter. The two reverse regression slopes are  λ1 and  λ2  and are defined based on the 
assumption that  that there exist two regimes. qit stands for the threshold variable, γ is the 
threshold value which splits the observations into two regimes: 1) above the threshold value 
(high regime), and 2) below the threshold value (low regime). εit  stands for the residual. I is 
the indicator term that signifies the regime specified by the threshold variable qit  and the 
threshold value γ.  As Kremer et al. (2011), we  use  mit as a vector of independent variables 
that includes one explanatory variable treated as endogenous and the other determinants as 
exogenous. 20  Moreover, Kremer et al. (2011) extends the Hansen’s (1999) model by 
including the regime dependent intercept, 𝛿1. Following Bick (2007), ignoring the regime 
 
19 In this study, we use the model proposed  by Kremer et al. (2011). That is an extension of the threshold 
methodology introduced by Hansen (1999). The extended method of Kremer et al. (2011) is built on the cross 
sectional technique of Caner and Hansen (2004), where GMM estimators are employed to account for 
endogeneity. As an extension to Caner and Hansen (2004) model, Kremer et al (2011) opt for a dynamic 
threshold methodology. 
20 We include all the explanatory variables of our fixed-effect and dynamic panel estimations apart from the 
CRS variable. The reason  being that we opt for the threshold methodology in order to allow our data to 
determine this period of the turmoil through the identification of regime changes of important corporate 
governance variable with respect to bank performance, rather than arbitrarily impose  the period of financial 








21 Kremer et al. (2011) employ the GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995) so as to avoid serial correlation 
in the residuals. Then, they measure a short type regression to obtain the predicted values of the endogenous 
variables using a function of instruments (Caner and Hansen, 2004). As a first step, the endogenous variable is 
replaced with the predicted values in equation (6). As a second step, threshold value is obtained via OLS method 
where the threshold variable has been replaced by its predicted values estimated in the first step. The threshold 
value is obtained so as to minimize  the concentrated sum of  squared errors (Chan, 1993; Hansen, 1997). Once 
threshold value has been determined, the regression slopes, λ1 and λ2 can be estimated  by employing the GMM 
estimator Caner and Hansen, 2004). 
 
